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Abstract 
This paper will assess the relationship between tenant characteristics and public REIT volatility. 
Specifically, we focus on the retail REIT subset of the industry. Given that retail REITs are one 
the most transparent asset classes, they provide an interesting landscape for evaluating the 
relationship between the firm and the customers, or in this case, the tenants. Specifically, we 
assess how major tenant ownership, public or private equity owned, impacts the volatility of the 
REIT’s stock price using 2010 data on 30 retail REITs. Controlling for tenant credit quality, 
leverage, ROE, book-to-market, size, age, region and property focus, we find that a higher 
percentage of rental revenue from private equity owned tenants is associated with lower REIT 
stock volatility, and a higher percentage of rental revenue from publicly owned tenants is 
associated with higher REIT stock volatility. 
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I. Introduction   
We analyze the relationship between tenant ownership and the volatility of the landlord 
REIT stock returns. Specifically, we focus on the retail REIT subset of the industry. Given the 
relative transparency of retail REITs and the increased risk-sharing relationship between the 
tenant and the landlord attributable to overage rent, they are an ideal sample for examining how 
tenant ownership impacts the volatility of the landlord REIT.  
For REITs, rent paying tenants are what drive cash flows. For most real estate, the lease 
establishes a fixed rental payment between the tenant and the landlord. Thus, the property owner 
holds some of the risk inherent in the tenant’s business. While the same can be said for the retail 
tenant and landlord relationship, retail leases are unique. Most retail leases establish both a fixed 
base rent and overage rent, or a percentage of sales as part of the rent.  Brueckner (1993), Lee 
(1995), Miceli and Sirmans (1995) and Colwell and Munneke (1998)1 consider overage rent a 
form of risk-sharing between the tenant and the landlord. In light of this lease structure, 
intuitively it would seem that retail REITs bear an even greater burden of risk. While tenant 
characteristics likely impact the performance of any REIT, we would expect tenant 
characteristics to have an even greater impact on retail REIT performance. This close 
relationship between performance of retail firms and retail REITs was confirmed by Myer and 
Webb (1994) who found a positive contemporaneous relationship between retail stocks and retail 
REITs, suggesting that retail stocks and retail REITs are subject to the same fundamentals. 
This raises the question: how do tenant characteristics impact retail REITs? In the fiscal 
year 2010 rankings of top 100 retailers ranked by total U.S. sales, 67 of the 100 companies are 
                                                          
1
 Mejia, Luis C. Mejia and John D. Benjamin, What Do We Know About the Determinants of Shopping Centers 
Sales? Spatial vs. Non-Spatial Factors 
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publicly traded. Of the top 20 companies, 19 are publicly traded.2 As these rankings demonstrate, 
the majority of the largest retail companies are publicly traded, while only 11 of the top 100 
companies are owned by private equity firms. These firms include Leonard Green & Partners, 
CVC Capital Partners, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Bain Capital, 3G Capital, TPG Capital, 
Warburg Pincus, Blackstone Group, and Sun Capital Partners.3 As the majority of the top 100 
retail firms are public, there must be something distinguishing the private equity owned firms 
from the remaining companies.  
This paper will primarily attempt to understand two key factors and their relationship to 
retail REIT stock price volatility: percentage of rental revenue derived from publicly traded 
tenants and percentage of rental revenue derived from private equity owned tenants. Controlling 
for retail REIT specific characteristics, we hope to understand if a relationship exists, and if so, 
try to understand why this relationship might exist. 
I. Historical Background of REITs 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, or more commonly known as REITs, were introduced in 
the United States under the Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960. The goal of this 
investment vehicle was to allow smaller investors the ability to incorporate the income yielding 
asset class into their portfolios.4 Since the introduction of REITs into the U.S. market, multiple 
legislation shifts have led to an evolving industry.5  
There are three categories of REITs: mortgage REITs, equity REITs, and hybrid REITs. 
Mortgage REITs lend money to developers and real estate owners which then invest directly in 
                                                          
2
 “2011 Top 100 Retailers,” http://www.stores.org/2011/Top-100-Retailers 
3
 20 of the companies are completely privately owned. Two of the firms are government owned. Non-private equity 
firms with ownership stakes in these companies included Vornado Realty Trust (Toys R Us), Highfields Capital 
Management (Michaels Stores), and Kangaroo Holdings (OSI Restaurant Partners). 
4
 Lee, Stephen L., The Changing Benefits of REITs to the Mixed Asset Portfolio, 204. 
5
 Ibid. 
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the real estate assets. Equity REITs buy properties directly in the expectation of realizing capital 
appreciation.  Hybrid REITs do a combination of both lending and purchasing the assets directly.  
During the 1960s, only ten REITs existed. By the mid-1970s, the REIT market expanded to 
approximately 50. At this time, most REITs were mortgage REITs involved in the funding of 
construction. In 1972, over 50% of all REITs were involved in the short-term construction and 
development loans. Thus, the earliest REITs were highly sensitive to changes in interest rates.6
 The oil price shock of 1973 resulted in high interest rates and an inverted yield curve. 
Consequently, REITs took a major hit and between 1974 and 1976—REIT assets fell from $20 
billion to $9.7 billion. Many REITs could not withstand the severe market conditions and 
consequently went bankrupt.7 The year 1986 marked an important shift for the REIT sector—
prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, REITs could not operate and manage their own real estate.8 
This change in tax code allowed REITs access to most types of income-producing real estate 
assets, and thus allowed REITs to increase their revenue generating capabilities and reduce their 
risk. This continued to attract institutional, corporate, and individual investors through the 
1980s.9  
 Two key developments in the early 1990s marked a turning point in the growth of REITs: 
the 5/50 rule was relaxed and the Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure was 
introduced. Prior to the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, the 5/50 rule prevented five or 
fewer individuals from holding more than 50% of a REIT’s shares.10 This policy prevented 
institutional investors from owning any significant holding in REITs as the institution was 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid., 205. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Luo, Trianjin. Is China Ready for REITs? An examination of challenges and opportunities.  
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considered one investor. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 allowed pension funds and 
mutual funds to count as the number of investors in the fund.11  
The introduction of the UPREIT structure allowed properties to be owned through a 
partnership or a series of partnerships.  These partnership units could be acquired and exchanged 
with no taxes on the transactions themselves. As it stands today, partners are only taxed on 
realized capital gains from REIT share transactions, and they can defer capital gain taxes until it 
is most tax-efficient to do so.12  
These two legislative developments in the early 1990s made REIT investing much more 
attractive to institutional investors. According to one study done by Chan, Leung, and Wang 
(1998), prior to the Revenue Reconciliation Reform of 1993, institutional ownership in REITs 
ranged from 12 to 14%. By 1995, institutional ownership increased substantially to 30%.13 
Today, REITs must distribute 90% of their income to shareholders to uphold their tax-exempt 
status, have a minimum of 100 direct shareholders, earn at least 75% of gross income as rent 
from real property or interest from mortgages on real property, and invest at least 75% of total 
assets in real estate.14 
 Within the REIT space today, there are diversified REITs and specialized REITs. 
According to the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts Handbook (1997-2006), 
10% of the REITs in the U.S. equity REIT sector are diversified by property type, while the 
remaining 90% specialize on one or two closely related property types.15 REITs specialize by 
                                                          
11
 The Changing Benefits of REITs to the Mixed Asset Portfolio, Stephen L. Lee, p 205. 
12
 Luo, Trianjin. Is China Ready for REITs? An examination of challenges and opportunities. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). NAREIT Timeline. 
15
 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). (1997-2006). NAREIT Handbook. 
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five broad categories: health care, industrial and office, lodging and resorts, residential, and 
retail.16 This paper will focus on retail REITs, REITs that own or operate retail property.  
II. Review of Related Literature 
There is a substantial amount of literature devoted to examining various characteristics of 
REITs. A recent study examined the return and risk characteristics of specialized versus 
diversified REITs (Ro, Ziobrowski 2009). Examining abnormal returns using CAPM and 
Carhart’s four-factor models with data from 1997 to 2006, the study found no evidence to 
suggest superior performance of REITs specializing in a specific property type suggesting no 
managerial advantage from gaining expertise in a specific property type. Additionally, consistent 
with market theory, the study found that specialized REITs exhibit higher market risk than do 
diversified REITs.17  
Another recent study examined the stock price synchronicity of REITs between 1997 and 
2006 (Chung, Fung, Shilling, Simmons-Mosley, 2010). In theory, as real estate assets can be 
insulated from market fluctuations, one might expect REIT returns to have low covariance with 
other assets, as well as other REITs. Contrary to market theory, the study found that REITs have 
high synchronicity. Larger, more liquid REITs, as measured by trading volume, exhibited higher 
synchronicity, as did industrial and retail REITs relative to apartment, health care, and mixed 
property REITs. This conclusion of relative synchronicity within property focus was expected 
given the greater exposure industrial and retail REITs have to economic fluctuations.18  
Furthermore, the study examined REIT synchronicity relative to hedge fund, pension 
fund, and insurance company ownership. The study found that REIT stock price synchronicity 
                                                          
16
 Ro, SeungHan, and Alan J. Ziobrowski, “Does Focus Really Matter? Specialized vs. Diversified REITs,” p. 74. 
17
 Ro, SeungHan, and Alan J. Ziobrowski, Does Focus Really Matter? Specialized vs. Diversified REITs 
18
 Chung, Richard, Fund, Scott, Schilling, James D., and Tammie X. Simmons-Mosley, What Determines Stock 
Price Synchronicity in REITs? 
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was negatively related to hedge fund ownership, and conversely, synchronicity was positively 
related to pension fund and insurance company ownership. This conclusion may be a result of 
the high costs to shorting REITs, and thus hedge funds need to do more due diligence to find 
REITs with lower stock price synchronicity.19  
 Virtually no research has been done analyzing how tenant characteristics impact landlord 
performance with the exception of a recent study, Is What’s Bad for the Goose (Tenant), Bad for 
the Gander (Landlord): A Retail Real Estate Perspective (C. Liu, P. Liu, 2011). The study 
utilized an event study approach to examine the impact tenant bankruptcies have on the risk and 
returns of their publicly traded landlord using a sample of retail REITs. The paper examined the 
abnormal returns of the landlord REIT for both the prior and post-bankruptcy announcement 
periods. The authors hypothesized that the market would react negatively or positively 
depending on whether the co-tenancy effect or the growth option effect dominated, 
respectively.20  
As retail leases often have co-tenancy provisions that allow tenants to negotiate lower 
base rents or penalty-free pullout if core tenants leave the center or if the occupancy threshold is 
reached, one would expect a bankruptcy filing of an anchor or core tenant to negatively impact 
the abnormal returns of the landlord company. That being said, the bankruptcy may also allow 
the company to find a better tenant and negotiate a new lease at the higher market rate. Thus, 
depending on which effect dominates, the authors hypothesized that the REIT stock would react 
accordingly.21  
                                                          
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Liu, Crocker H., and Peng Liu, Is What’s Bad for the Goose (Tenant), Bad for the Gander (Landlord): A Retail 
Real Estate Perspective 
21
 Ibid. 
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 Liu and Liu controlled for the quality location of the center, whether or not the 
bankrupted tenant was an anchor, market return on the REIT/Ziman index, firm size, and 
leverage. The study measured the location quality using the average industry diversification ratio 
of the REIT’s top markets. Using the United States Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 
data on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), the study estimated the REIT’s level of exposure 
to other industries. Liu and Liu hypothesized that REITs with more access to local economies 
and diverse industries would respond more strongly to a tenant bankruptcy. Liu and Liu 
measured firm size using the logarithm of book asset value and measured leverage using the 
REIT’s total debt over total capitalization.22   
The study found significant negative abnormal returns following the bankruptcy of a 
tenant, suggesting that the market expects existing tenants to take advantage of the co-tenancy 
provisions. However, the study also found that there are some situations in which the growth 
option dominated. The location quality of the landlord—whether the malls or shopping centers 
are located in diverse economic markets—played a big role in determining the significance of the 
growth option.23  
 The Liu and Liu (2011) study suggests that under the extreme circumstances of a tenant 
bankruptcy, public REITs experience negative abnormal returns.24 This study does not address 
how tenant characteristics impact REIT performance under normal circumstances. This paper 
will attempt to address this subject.  
                                                          
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
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III. Theory & Hypothesis  
 Past literature has addressed key differences between public companies and private 
equity owned companies. The theory that much of this debate focuses on is what is known as 
agency theory. Agency theory is directed at the agency relationship in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs the work. Agency theory uses the 
metaphor of a contract to describe this relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).25  
 Agency theory focuses on the two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The 
first problem arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) when 
it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The second 
problem arises when the principal and agent have different tolerances for risk, and therefore 
prefer different actions based on their differing attitudes toward risk.26 Using the metaphor of a 
contract, the theory focuses on determining the most efficient contract to govern the principal-
agent relationship given assumptions about people (self-interested, rationale, risk aversion), 
organizations (conflicting goals among members), and information (a commodity which can be 
purchased).27  
 Agency theory provides a theoretical framework in which we can understand differences 
between public companies and private equity owned firms. In a public corporation, it is the 
stockholder (principal) who bears the risk, while it is the manager (agent) who is contracted to 
make the decisions on behalf of the principal.28 For private equity owned companies, agency 
theory contends that performance improvements observed following a buyout are the result of 
                                                          
25
 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 58. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Bruton, Garry D., J. Kay Keels, Elton L. Scifres, Corporate restructuring and performance: An agency 
perspective on the complete buyout cycle 
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management’s increased ownership stake in the firm, and thus the principal-agent incentives 
become aligned (Jensen, 1989).29 
 Although the performance associated with reverse buyouts (the second half of the buyout 
cycle) is not as well understood, the research on the firm’s performance during the private phase 
of the buyout cycle supports the improved performance.30 Opler (1992) finds that operating 
profits divided by sales rise by an average of 16.5% from one year before until two years after 
the LBO.31 After adjusting for industry trends, operating profits divided by sales rise by an 
average 11.6%. Opler’s study shows that LBOs have little impact on R&D, but result in sharp 
declines in capital expenditures and income taxes paid.32 Opler’s results are largely consistent 
with the results of Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990).33  
 These studies’ results are in line with what agency theory would predict, and thus, we 
want to apply this theory to the context of retail REITs. A retail REIT derives rental revenue 
from four categories of tenants: publicly owned, private equity owned, privately owned, and 
government owned. Focusing on tenants who fall into the former two categories, agency theory 
would seem to suggest that buyout tenants suffer less from the principal-agent problem, and thus, 
REITs with more revenue derived from buyout tenants perform better, or are less volatile, than 
REITs with more publicly owned tenants.  
In concurrence with agency theory, Opler and Titman (1988) propose in a later study that 
a firm’s decision of whether or not to undertake a leveraged buyout can be understood as a trade-
off between the incentive alignment and tax benefits and the financial costs of distress. Firms 
that choose to undertake an LBO will have many common characteristics including high, stable 
                                                          
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Ibid.  
31
 The study examined a sample of 44 going-private transactions completed between 1985 and 1989. 
32
 Opler, Tim C., Operating Performance in Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence From 1985-1989, 28. 
33
 Ibid. 
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cash flows, collateralizability of assets, durability of the firm’s products and high growth 
prospects. Given REITs’ reliance on lease payments, stable cash flows is pertinent to their 
business model. Therefore, agency theory suggests that leveraged buyouts will improve 
operational performance by reducing principal-agent problems, and Opler and Titman’s analysis 
of the trade-off of undertaking an LBO suggests that firms that LBO firms will have high cash 
flow characteristics. Both theories suggest the hypothesis that retail REITs with more rental 
revenue from private equity owned tenants (as a proxy for firms that have undergone buyouts) 
will exhibit lower volatility of stock returns.  
 Perhaps conflicting with agency theory and Opler and Titman’s trade-off framework, the 
asymmetric information and volatility relationship may actually support a different hypothesis. 
As LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) present evidence that the variability of stock 
prices cannot be accounted for by information about future dividends, their study suggests that 
asymmetric information increases stock price volatility. When an informed investor acts on 
private information, the uninformed investor does not know how to price in that trading into their 
model as the information motivating the trade is unknown. Thus, the private information acts like 
noise and increases stock price volatility.   In the context of public and private equity owned 
tenants, a REIT’s increased revenue from private equity ownership could increase the asymmetry 
of information amongst investors. Under this theory, we would expect private equity ownership 
to be associated with higher REIT stock price volatility.  
 Thus, we propose 2 hypotheses: 
A) Retail REIT stock volatility is negatively related to percentage of rental revenue derived 
from private equity owned tenants. Retail REIT stock volatility is positively related to 
percentage of rental revenue derived from publicly owned tenants. 
11 
 
 
 
a. Reason: Agency theory implies that buyouts reduce principal-agent problem and 
improve operational performance. Conversely, agency theory implies that public 
firms suffer more from the principal-agent problem. 
b. Reason: Trade-off between incentive alignment and tax benefits and financial 
distress costs results in firms with higher, more stable cash flows undertaking 
buyouts. Conversely, firms, such as public companies, whose financial distress 
costs exceed potential benefits from an LBO lack some key characteristics such as 
stable cash flows, durability of firm’s products, and high growth prospects that 
make for an ideal tenant for a retail REIT.  
B) Retail REIT stock volatility is positively related to percentage of rental revenue derived 
from private equity owned tenants. Retail REIT stock volatility is negatively related to 
percentage of rental revenue derived from publicly owned tenants. 
a. Reason: Asymmetric information and opacity, arising from private equity owned 
tenants, results in increased volatility, in part attributable to noise trading.  
IV. Data  
Table 1 shows the list of 30 publicly traded retail REITs that were included in this study, 
along with relevant characteristics. This list reflects almost all of the companies used in the Liu 
and Liu bankruptcy event study with the exception of Feldman Mall Properties, Inc. (FMLP), 
which filed for bankruptcy in 2008, and Getty Realty Corp. (GTY), which strictly owns and 
operates gas stations and convenience stores.  
Rubin and Smith (2010) compile past literature that has been done on firm-specific 
variables and volatility to devise a model. Adjusting their approach for our analysis, we use 
control variables including tenant credit quality, leverage, ROE, book-to-market, size, age, 
12 
 
 
 
region and property focus. Our variables of interests are percentage of rental revenue from 
publicly owned tenants and percentage of rental revenue from private equity owned tenants. The 
primary dependent variable tested was stock price volatility (VOLATILITY), calculated using 
annualized standard deviation of monthly returns obtained from CRSP from January 1, 2010 to 
March 31, 2011. Consistent with the notion that stock prices could take time to price in data 
released in the 10-K, this additional three-month window allows for the 2010 annual report data 
to be fully priced in to the REIT’s stock price.  
Additionally, we run regressions using return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) 
and occupancy (OCCUPANCY) as dependent variables. ROE measures a corporation’s 
profitability by demonstrating how much profit a firm generates with the money shareholders 
have invested. ROE was calculated as the trailing 12-month net income available for common 
shareholders divided by the average total common equity. ROE was obtained from Bloomberg as 
of fiscal year end 2010. ROA indicates the profitability of a firm relative to its assets. ROA 
reflects the trailing 12-month net income divided by the average total assets. ROA was obtained 
from Bloomberg as of fiscal year end 2010. 
Occupancy represents the percentage of the REIT’s square footage that is leased. 
OCCUPANCY was calculated using average property occupancy, weighted according to the 
gross leasable assets (GLA) of the property and adjusted for ownership interest. OCCUPANCY 
was calculated using information in the 2010 10-K filing, as well as the Q4 2010 Financial 
Supplemental, available on most company websites. Ideally, we would have access to every 
tenant of each REIT. However, in light of reporting differences across companies, tenant 
characteristics were based on the top ten tenants. In most cases, companies reported the top ten 
tenants as a percentage of annualized base rent (ABR) or of rental revenue. A select group of 
13 
 
 
 
companies reported major tenants as a percentage of GLA, in which case estimations were 
needed based on average per square foot (PSF) annualized base rent for the year. Tenant credit 
quality (INVESTMENT_GRADE) was measured looking at the top ten major tenants of each 
REIT. This variable reflects the percentage of ABR attributable to investment grade quality 
tenants, BBB-/Baa234 and above.  
Leverage (LEVERAGE was measured using the total short and long-term debt to market 
capitalization ratio obtained from Bloomberg as of fiscal year end 2010. Book-to-market 
(BOOKTOMKT) was calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity, obtained from Bloomberg as of fiscal year end 2010. Cao et al. (2008) believe that 
growth options explain the increasing trend in firm-specific risk. Therefore, growth options have 
a positive relationship with idiosyncratic risk. BOOKTOMKT is capturing the growth options of 
the firm. SIZE was the natural log of the market value of equity. Although Liu and Liu (2011) 
control for size as the logarithm of book value of assets, given the hire variability in total assets 
in my sample, we believed Rubin and Smith’s (2010) method of controlling for size using equity 
would be a better alternative.  
AGE was estimated using the date of IPO as a proxy. We calculated months since IPO 
and then divided by 12 for estimation in years. AGE is the natural log of estimation of years of 
age. 35  Region was categorized as NORTHEAST, MIDWEST, SOUTH, or WEST. When 
possible, this represented where the majority of rental revenue came from. When this was not 
available, we used where the majority of square footage was located. When this was not 
available, we used the number of properties as an estimate. In the regressions, these variables 
                                                          
34
 S&P/Moody’s rating obtained from Bloomberg. 
35
 Rubin and Smith (2010) estimated age using the date that the company first appeared on CRSP. This is likely a 
more accurate method although this information as unavailable for our use. 
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were used as dummy variables taking on the value of 1 if the REIT is concentrated in that region. 
WEST was omitted from the regression to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. 
The last control, property focus, was categorized as SHOPPING_CENTER, 
SINGLE_TENANT, REGIONAL_MALL, or OUTLET_CENTER. These four categorizations 
are consistent with those of Liu and Liu (2011). A shopping center is a group of retail and 
commercial establishments that is developed and managed as a single property. On-site parking 
is provided and the common anchors include supermarkets, drugstores, and discount department 
stores (e.g. Safeway, CVS, and TJMaxx). Retail REITs with a single tenant focus own stand-
alone space or own space within a larger retail center. Regional malls are typically enclosed and 
climate-controlled. Stores are connected through common walkways and parking surrounds the 
perimeter of the mall. Regional mall stores include fashion apparel (e.g. The Gap, Abercrombie 
& Fitch, and Express) and large department stores (e.g. Sears, Macy’s, and Kohl’s). Outlet 
centers are the manufacturers’ outlet stores and can vary from high-end designer to discount 
apparel. Stores typically carry discounted merchandise and use their outlets as a means to create 
room for new inventory. The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) publishes 
definitions of each type of retail centers. Table 7 summarizes this data.  
Finally, the variables of interest are public ownership tenants (TOP10_PUBLIC) and 
private equity ownership tenants (TOP10_PE). TOP10_PUBLIC was accounted for by 
calculating the percentage of ABR attributable to publicly traded companies, and likewise, 
TOP10_PE was accounted for by calculating the percentage of ABR attributable to tenants 
owned by private equity firms. This data was obtained through the companies’ 2010 10-K filing 
and the Q4 2010 Financial Supplemental.  See table 2 for summary statistics, table 3 for the 
correlation matrix, and table 4 for REIT specific data.   
15 
 
 
 
V. Results & Analysis 
Investigating the impact of major tenant ownership on REIT volatility, we run twelve 
regressions of the following forms: 
(i)VOLATILITYi=αi+β1TOP10_PUBLICi+ β2 TOP10_PEi + 
β3INVESTMENT_GRADEi + β4LEVERAGEi+ β 5ROEi+β6BOOKTOMKTi+ β7SIZEi + 
β8AGEi+ β9NORTHEASTi+ β10MIDWESTi+ β11SOUTHi+ β12SHOPPING_CENTERi+ 
Β13SINGLE_TENANTi+ β14REGIONAL_MALLi+εi  
 
(ii) ROEi= αi+β1TOP10_PUBLICi+ β2 TOP10_PEi + β3INVESTMENT_GRADEi + 
β4LEVERAGEi+ β 5ROEi+β6BOOKTOMKTi+ β7SIZEi + β8AGEi+ β9NORTHEASTi+ 
β10MIDWESTi+ β11SOUTHi+εi  
 
(iii) ROAi= αi+β1TOP10_PUBLICi+ β2 TOP10_PEi + β3INVESTMENT_GRADEi + 
β4LEVERAGEi+ β 5ROEi+β6BOOKTOMKTi+ β7SIZEi + β8AGEi+ β9NORTHEASTi+ 
β10MIDWESTi+ β11SOUTHi+εi  
 
(iv) OCCUPANCYi= αi+β1TOP10_PUBLICi+ β2 TOP10_PEi + 
β3INVESTMENT_GRADEi + β4LEVERAGEi+ β 5ROEi+β6BOOKTOMKTi+ β7SIZEi + 
β8AGEi+ β9NORTHEASTi+ β10MIDWESTi+ β11SOUTHi+εi  
 
These regressions are run using robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity—when 
the data lacks constant variance. One of the assumptions of OLS is that the error term has 
constant variance. When this is not the case, heteroskedasticty will increase the probability of 
Type I error. Using robust standard errors controls for this potential skew in the data.  
Table 5 reports the results of model (i). (1) We first regress REIT VOLATILITY on 
TOP10_PUBLIC and TOP10_PE. TOP10_PUBLIC is not significant suggesting that it does not 
explain any of the variance in VOLATILITY, while TOP10_PE is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level implying that firms with a higher percentage of private equity owned 
tenants exhibit lower stock price volatility. According to the adjusted-R2 of (1), TOP10_PUBLIC 
and TOP10_PE explain only 3% of the variation in volatility across our sample of retail REITs.  
Adding INVESTMENT_GRADE to control for tenant credit risk characteristics (2), we 
find that TOP10_PE remains statistically significant at the 1% level and 
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INVESTMENT_GRADE is also negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on INVESTMENT_GRADE is -0.63. As we add more control 
variables, this coefficient falls, in magnitude, to as low as -0.34. Adding 
INVESTMENT_GRADE makes the coefficient on TOP10_PUBLIC positive and statistically 
significant suggesting that a higher percentage of annualized base rent derived from public 
companies may actually increase volatility of retail REIT returns. Controlling for tenant credit 
characteristics increases the explanatory power of the model—the adjusted R2 suggests that (2) 
explains 24% of the variation in VOLATILITY.  
In line with our expectations, LEVERAGE has a positive, statistically significant 
relationship with volatility (3). Holding all else equal, firms with higher leverage will exhibit 
higher volatility. After adding LEVERAGE, the model explains 45% of the variation in 
VOLATILITY. Adding ROE to the model further increases our explanatory power. ROE has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient suggesting that higher ROE is associated with 
slightly lower volatility. This result is slightly counterintuitive given that leverage generally 
increases ROE. We would therefore expect ROE to have a positive coefficient when regressed 
against VOLATILITY. However, this coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% level.  
BOOKTOMKT does not explain any of the variation in VOLATILITY. Given that the 
variable is supposed to control for the growth options of the firm that contribute to idiosyncratic 
risk, we would expect this to have a positive, statistically significant effect on volatility. 
Similarly, SIZE does not explain any of the variation in volatility, contrary to the results of Sias 
(1996) who finds a negative relationship between firm size and stock volatility. We attribute 
these results to a small sample size, a limitation in our analysis. AGE has a positive, statistically 
significant coefficient in regressions (7) to (8). This is counter to the research of Pastor and 
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Veronesi (2003), which shows that younger firms are associated with greater uncertainty and 
thus exhibit higher stock volatility. As we use IPO date as a proxy for age, this may have 
significantly inaccurately estimated the firm’s age. Past studies have used the date the firm starts 
appearing on the CRSP database to estimate age, although this data was unfortunately 
unavailable for our research.  
Property focus does not explain any of the variance in VOLATILITY. This may be due to 
the narrow focus of our sample set, as past findings show key differences attributable to property 
focus across the broader REIT industry.36 NORTHEAST has a negative statistically significant 
coefficient in (7). While we cannot interpret direct causality, this suggests that the retail REITs 
with more properties in the NORTHEAST are less volatile. REITs with a regional focus in the 
Northeast include Acadia Realty Trust, Alexander’s, Inc., Cedar Realty Trust, Pennsylvania 
REIT, and Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc. One explanation for this result is that the Northeast 
region has significant barriers to entry and limited sites. With strong demographics in the 
Northeast region, there has been significant competition amongst buyers to gain access to this 
market, indicative of how attractive the Northeast region is to investors. In the case of these 
REITs with focus in the Northeast, they are less exposed to the economic climate given the 
demographics and location in a densely populated region. This could explain why the 
NORTHEAST dummy variable has a negative, statistically significant coefficient.    
In regressions (2) though (8), TOP10_PUBLIC, TOP10_PE, INVESTMENT_GRADE, 
and LEVERAGE had statistically significant coefficients. Holding all else constant, our data 
implies the following conclusions: a higher percentage of ABR from public tenants is associated 
with higher volatility, a higher percentage of ABR from private equity owned tenants is 
                                                          
36
 Chung, Richard, Fund, Scott, Schilling, James D., and Tammie X. Simmons-Mosley, What Determines Stock 
Price Synchronicity in REITs? 
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associated with lower volatility, a higher percentage of revenue from investment grade quality 
tenants is associated with lower volatility, and higher leverage is associated with higher 
volatility.  
While the focus of this paper is to understand the relationship between volatility and 
tenant ownership, to test the strength of our dependent variable we regress ROE, ROA, and 
OCCUPANCY on our control variables and variables of interest. While ROE and ROA are both 
commonly used performance metrics, they are really quite different.37 If a company had no debt, 
its ROE and ROA would be the same, as shareholders’ equity would equal total assets. As a 
company takes on debt, shareholders’ equity gets smaller and thus increases ROE. In other 
words, ROE is highly sensitive to leverage. While ROE reveals how effectively a company uses 
its shareholders’ invested capital, it does not indicate how efficiently a firm utilizes borrowed 
funds. ROA is arguably a more critical metric then ROE. That being said, as past literature uses 
both ROE and ROA as dependent variables, we decided it would be appropriate to display the 
results of both regressions.38 Table 6 shows the results of model regressions (ii), (iii), and (iv). 
Again, the LEVERAGE relation to ROE yields surprising results (10).  
LEVERAGE exhibits a negative, statistically significant coefficient when regressed on 
ROE. While leverage generally increases ROE, as a simple DuPont decomposition reveals, this 
does not hold true in our data.39 One possible explanation for this is that when REIT leverage 
increases enough that the cost of debt becomes very high, this will reduce the firm’s profit 
margin and in turn reduce ROE. Further research would need to be done to really explore this 
relationship. BOOKTOMKT likewise exhibits a negative, statistically significant coefficient 
                                                          
37
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between ROE and ROA in our sample is 0.82. 
38
 Rhoades, Dawna L., Paula L. Rechner, and Chamu Sundaramurthy, A Meta-analysis of Board Leadership 
Structure and Financial Performance: are “two heads better than one”? 
39
 ROE=Net Income/Sales x Sales/Assets x Assets/BVEquity or ROE=Profit Margin x Asset Turnover x Leverage 
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when regressed on ROE. This logically follows as firms with large book values of equity to 
market value of equity will have lower growth prospects and presumably lower ROE.  
Using ROA as the dependent variable, regression (11) results in a positive coefficient on 
TOP10_PE, suggesting that more private equity owned tenants is associated with higher ROA. 
As ROA is the 2010 trailing 12-month net income divided by the average total assets, this 
suggests private equity ownership is positive for firm profitability, as well as volatility. Similar 
to ROE, ROA and leverage appear to have an inverse relationship. After controlling for tenant 
ownership characteristics, credit risk, leverage, book-to-market, firm size, age, and region, 
regression (11) explains 63% of the variation in ROA.  The last model (12) assesses the 
determinants of REIT occupancy. These results were minimal, however we don’t find this 
surprising given how little variation there is in occupancy rates. Excluding RPI with an 
occupancy rate of 47.1%, the mean occupancy rate of the retail REITs is 92.7%, with a standard 
deviation of 3.2%. We believe this lack of variation in the data inhibited the data from detecting 
a relationship. Overall, we do not believe ROE, ROA, and OCCUPANCY are better dependent 
variables than VOLATILITY.  
VI. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to understand the relationship between tenant ownership and retail 
REIT stock volatility. Controlling for tenant credit quality, leverage, ROE, book-to-market, size, 
age, region and property focus, we find that a higher percentage of rental revenue from private 
equity owned tenants is associated with lower REIT stock volatility and a higher percentage of 
rental revenue from publicly owned tenants is associated with higher REIT stock volatility.  
As agency theory suggests that buyout firms will experience improved operational 
performance due to the reduction of the principal-agent problem, this theory supports the 
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hypothesis that REITs with more rental revenue derived from buyout firms, or private equity 
owned firms as a proxy, will have lower volatility of stock returns. The trade-off firms face 
between incentive alignment and tax benefits and the costs of financial distress when deciding 
whether or not to undertake a buyout, suggests that firms that undertake buyouts with have 
certain characteristics that will make them an ideal tenant for a REIT. These characteristics 
include stable cash flows, durability of firm’s products, and high growth prospects. Therefore, 
this trade-off supports the same hypothesis as agency theory, that REITs with more rental 
revenue from private equity owned firms will have reduced volatility of stock returns.  
On the contrary, private equity owned tenants could increase the asymmetric information 
present amongst REIT investors and thus increase stock volatility, in accordance with the 
literature of LeRoy, Porter, and Shiller (1981). This research supports the former hypothesis that 
increased revenue from private equity owned tenants may reduce REIT stock volatility. 
Unfortunately, we cannot break down whether agency theory or the predetermined 
characteristics of a firm that undergoes a buyout is driving the relationship we observe.  
The primary limitation of this study is the size of the sample we examine—we examine 
30 retail REITs. Given the relative transparency of retail REITs, we felt this was an ideal subset 
sample for our research. However, for future research we hope to examine how this relationship 
holds in the broader REIT industry. Another limitation of our study is that not all tenants were 
disclosed by the retail REIT. We had to use the top ten tenants as a proxy for the characteristics 
of all of the REIT’s tenants, which may have resulted in estimation error. Similarly, some tenants 
reported top tenants as a percentage of gross leasable assets, rather than a percentage of 
annualized base rent. We had to make assumptions about the base rent per square foot of these 
tenants to then estimate the rent from the top tenants. This likely resulted in estimation error that 
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may have skewed the data. And lastly, we were unable to account for the overage rents 
negotiated into the leases into our analysis. We propose this area for future study.  
Despite these limitations, our research furthers the rather limited literature done assessing 
how tenant characteristics impact REIT volatility and finds evidence to suggest that a higher 
percentage of rental revenue from private equity owned tenants is associated with lower REIT 
stock volatility and a higher percentage of rental revenue from publicly owned tenants is 
associated with higher REIT stock volatility. 
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VII.  APPENDIX  
Table 1—Sample of Retail REITs 
 
1. Annualized standard deviation is shorter as it went public later. 
2. Calculated where the majority of rental revenue came from whenever possible. When this was not available, we 
used where the majority of square footage was located. When this was not available, we used the number of 
properties as an estimate. 
3. Gross Leasable Assets (GLA) reflects ownership adjusted GLA.  When total GLA was not available used 
%GLA occupied by major tenants to solve for total GLA. For most companies, this value will differ from 
company stated total GLA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Estate Investent Trust Ticker Property Focus Regional Focus2 IPO Date Total GLA3
Acadia Realty Trust AKR Shopping Center Northeast 5/27/1993 6,834,617
Agree Realty Corporation ADC Single Tenant Midwest 4/22/1994 3,848,464
Alexander's, Inc. ALX Regional Mall Northeast 7/19/1984 3,394,000
CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. CBL Regional Mall Midwest 10/27/1993 69,427,195
Cedar Realty Trust CDR Shopping Center Northeast 11/25/1986 14,535,000
Developers Diversified Realty Trust DDR Shopping Center South 2/3/1993 55,612,082
Equity One, Inc. EQY Shopping Center South 5/13/1998 19,560,461
Excel Trust, Inc.  EXL Shopping Center South 4/22/20101 2,595,303
Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT Shopping Center South 9/10/1962 18,604,000
General Growth Properties, Inc. GGP Regional Mall West 4/8/1993 157,609,069
Glimcher Realty Trust GRT Regional Mall Midwest 1/19/1994 18,945,426
Inland Real Estate Corporation IRC Shopping Center Midwest 8/14/2002 13,497,552
Kimco Realty Corporation KIM Shopping Center South 11/22/1991 80,694,853
Kite Realty Group Trust KRG Shopping Center Midwest 8/10/2004 5,714,230
Macerich Company MAC Regional Mall West 3/9/1994 24,687,392
National Retail Properties, Inc. NNN Single Tenant South 10/9/1984 12,972,000
One Liberty Properties OLP Single Tenant South 12/20/1982 3,996,196
Pennsylvania REIT PEI Regional Mall Northeast 12/27/1960 24,416,624
Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust RPT Shopping Center Midwest 5/31/1996 11,151,199
Realty Income O Single Tenant South 8/15/1994 21,215,800
Regency Centers REG Shopping Center South 10/29/1993 29,329,820
Retail Opportunity Investments Corporation ROIC Shopping Center West 10/17/2007 1,555,437
Roberts Realty Investors, Inc. RPI Shopping Center South 12/9/1997 150,186
Saul Centers, Inc. BFS Shopping Center South 8/19/1993 8,900,813
Simon Property Group, Inc. SPG Regional Mall South 12/13/1993 304,806,797
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. SKT Outlet Center South 6/4/1993 9,550,553
Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO Regional Mall South 11/20/1992 19,073,770
Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc. UBA Shopping Center Northeast 7/6/1969 3,839,226
Weingarten Realty Investors WRI Shopping Center West 8/16/1985 59,945,629
Whitestone REIT  WSR Shopping Center South 8/25/20101 3,162,020   
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Table 2—Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
TOP10_PUBLIC 30 0.210 0.105 0.038 0.620
TOP10_PE 30 0.021 0.033 0 0.157
INVESTMENT_GRADE 30 0.109 0.131 0 0.672
LEVERAGE 30 1.016 0.626 0.231 2.763
ROE 30 0.017 0.125 -0.272 0.408
ROA 30 0.006 0.034 -0.117 0.055
BOOKTOMKT 30 0.731 0.491 -0.191 2.414
SIZE 30 7.057 1.586 2.715 10.280
AGE 30 19.622 11.801 0.583 51.000
NORTHEAST 30 0.167 0.379 0 1
MIDWEST 30 0.200 0.407 0 1
SOUTH 30 0.500 0.509 0 1
WEST 30 0.133 0.346 0 1
SHOPPING_CENTER 30 0.567 0.504 0 1
SINGLE_TENANT 30 0.133 0.346 0 1
REGIONAL_MALL 30 0.267 0.450 0 1
OUTLET_CENTER 30 0.033 0.183 0 1
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Table 3—Correlation Matrix 
 
VOLATILITY TOP10_PUBLIC TOP10_PE
INVESTMENT_
GRADE LEVERAGE ROE BOOKTOMKT SIZE AGE NORTHEAST MIDWEST SOUTH WEST
SHOPPING_
CENTER
REGIONAL_
MALL
SINGLE_
TENANT
OUTLET_
CENTER OCCUPANCY ROA
VOLATILITY 1
TOP10_PUBLIC 0.066 1
TOP10_PE -0.307 -0.123 1
INVESTMENT_GRADE -0.328 0.584 -0.117 1
LEVERAGE 0.615 -0.161 -0.219 -0.323 1
ROE -0.530 0.079 -0.007 0.185 -0.480 1
BOOKTOMKT 0.427 0.037 0.002 -0.079 0.483 -0.612 1
SIZE -0.249 -0.266 0.030 -0.062 -0.339 0.196 -0.688 1
AGE 0.254 0.135 -0.075 0.017 -0.010 0.101 -0.242 0.425 1
NORTHEAST -0.066 0.111 -0.027 0.049 0.244 0.058 0.113 -0.113 0.335 1
MIDWEST 0.152 0.185 -0.020 -0.033 0.310 -0.058 0.057 -0.199 -0.072 -0.224 1
SOUTH -0.101 -0.090 0.022 0.074 -0.321 0.161 -0.122 0.070 -0.155 -0.447 -0.500 1
WEST 0.041 -0.208 0.022 -0.124 -0.160 -0.233 -0.011 0.256 -0.054 -0.175 -0.196 -0.392 1
SHOPPING_CENTER -0.274 -0.267 -0.103 0.059 -0.060 -0.071 0.423 -0.344 -0.326 0.030 -0.067 0.067 -0.053 1
REGIONAL_MALL 0.294 -0.185 -0.201 -0.428 0.322 -0.095 -0.365 0.427 0.230 0.135 0.075 -0.302 0.207 -0.690 1
SINGLE_TENANT 0.129 0.481 0.475 0.043 -0.227 0.167 -0.034 -0.091 0.155 -0.175 0.049 0.196 -0.154 -0.449 -0.237 1
OUTLET_CENTER -0.214 0.284 -0.120 0.809 -0.198 0.111 -0.203 0.069 0.038 -0.083 -0.093 0.186 -0.073 -0.212 -0.112 -0.073 1
OCCUPANCY -0.345 0.142 0.181 0.276 -0.260 0.444 -0.627 0.510 0.171 0.061 0.127 -0.166 0.028 -0.304 0.067 0.295 0.118 1
ROA -0.553 0.188 0.165 0.245 -0.552 0.821 -0.747 0.363 0.209 0.106 0.005 0.039 -0.179 -0.260 -0.030 0.353 0.124 0.746 1
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Table 4—Top 10 Major Tenant Data 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Acadia Realty Trust (AKR)3
A&P1 B-/B3
TJX Companies 4.2% A/A3
Supervalu 4.7% B+/B1
Sears 2.8% CCC+/B3
Wal-Mart 2.9% AA/Aa2
Ahold 2.6% BBB/Baa3
The Home Depot 2.1% A-/A3
Barnes & Noble 2.0%
Sleepy’s
Pier 1 Imports 1.1%
Agree Realty Corporation (ADC)3
Borders 20.0%   
Walgreens 31.0% A/A3
Kmart 11.0% CCC+/B3
Alexander's, Inc. (ALX)2
Sears 23.4% CCC+/B3
Bloomberg LP   
The Home Depot 0.8% A-/A3
Costco 1.5% A+/A1
The Container Store 0.3% NR/B3
Century 21   
Kohl's 1.4% BBB+/Baa1
Hennes & Mauritz 0.3%   
Lowe's 1.2% A-/A3
New World Mall LLC   
CBL & Associates Properties (CBL)3
Limited Brands 3.2% BB+/Ba1
Foot Locker 2.5% BB/Ba3
Abercrombie & Fitch, Co.  2.2%   
The Gap 2.2% BB+/NR
American Eagle Outfitters 2.2%   
Signet Jewelers 1.9%
Dick's Sporting Goods 1.6%
Genesco Inc.1 BB-/NR
Luxottica Group, S.P.A. 1.5% BBB+/NR
Zale Corporation  1.3%
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Table 4 Cont.
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Cedar Realty Trust (CDR)3
Giant Foods 17.8% BBB/Baa3
Stop & Shop 2.7% BBB/Baa3
Farm Fresh 2.4%   
LA Fitness 2.4%   
Discount Drug Mart   
Staples 1.9% BBB/Baa2
Shaw’s 1.7% B+/B1
CVS 1.5% BBB+/Baa2
Best Buy 1.5% BBB- /Baa2
Lowe’s 1.5% A-/A3
Developers Diversified Realty Trust (DDR)4
Wal-Mart 4.1% AA/Aa2
TJX Companies 2.2% A/A3
PetSmart 1.9% BB+/NR
Bed, Bath & Beyond 1.8% BBB+/NR
Kohl's 1.6% BBB+/Baa1
Michael's 1.5% A/A3
Lowe's 1.4% A-/A3
Rite Aid 1.3% B-/Caa2
The Gap 1.2% BB+/NR
OfficeMax 1.2% B-/B1
Equity One, Inc. (EQY)3
Publix   
Supervalu 2.0% B+/B1
Kroger 4.3% BBB/Baa2
TJX Companies 1.8% A/A3
Bed, Bath & Beyond 1.4% BBB+/NR
LA Fitness 1.0%   
Costco 0.8% A+/A1
Winn Dixie 2.1%   
Office Depot 1.3% B-/B2
Dollar Tree 1.4%   
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Excel Trust, Inc. (EXL)3
Lowe's 7.1% A-/A3
Walgreens 6.0% A/A3
Publix Supermarkets, Inc.   
Supervalu 4.4% B+/B1
Dick’s Sporting Goods 2.6%
Jo-Ann 2.5% B/B2
Rave Motion Pictures   
Giant Foods. 2.4% BBB/Baa3
Ross Stores 2.2%   
Safeway 2.2% BBB/Baa3
Federal Realty Investment Trust (FRT)4
Bed, Bath & Beyond 2.6% BBB+/NR
Ahold 2.5% BBB/Baa3
TJX Companies 2.1% A/A3
The Gap 1.7% BB+/NR
CVS 1.6% BBB+/Baa2
Safeway 1.6% BBB/Baa3
Barnes & Noble 1.4%
LA Fitness 1.1%   
OPNET Tech 1.0%   
Best Buy 0.9% BBB-  /Baa2
General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP)4
The Gap 2.9% BB+/NR
Limited Brands 2.9% BB+/Ba1
Abercrombie & Fitch 2.3%   
Foot Locker 2.3% BB/Ba3
Golden Gate Capital 1.7%   
American Eagle Outfitters 1.6%   
Forever 21   
Macy's 1.4% BBB/Baa3
Luxottica Group, S.P.A. 1.3% BBB+/NR
Genesco, Inc BB-/NR
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Glimcher Realty Trust (GRT)4
The Gap 2.4% BB+/ 
Limited Brands 2.1% BB+/Ba1
Foot Locker 2.0% BB/Ba3
Signet Jewelers 1.9%
AMC 1.8% B/NR
Bain Capital (Burlington Coat Factory, Cohoes Fashion, 
Guitar Center, Gymboree) 1.7%   
Forever 21   
Sears 1.6% CCC+/B3
Bon-Ton 1.5% B-/NR
JCPenney 1.5% BB/NR
Inland Real Estate Corporation (IRC)4
Supervalu 7.3% B+/B1
Roundy's 4.6%   
Dominick's 4.0% BBB/Baa3
TJX Companies 3.2% A/A3
Carmax 2.6%   
PetSmart 2.4% BB+/ 
Kroger 1.9% BBB/Baa2
Best Buy 1.6% BBB-/Baa2
Sports Authority 1.5% B-/NR
Michael's 1.5% A/A3
Kimco Realty Corporation (KIM)4
The Home Depot 3.0% A-/A3
TJX Companies 2.8% A/A3
Wal-Mart 2.4% AA/Aa2
Kmart 2.3% CCC+/B3
Best Buy 1.6% BBB-/Baa2
Kohl's 1.6% BBB+/Baa1
Royal Ahold 1.5% BBB/Baa3
Bed, Bath & Beyond 1.5% BBB+/ 
Costco 1.3% A+/A1
Petsmart 1.3% BB+/NR
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Kite Realty Group Trust (KRG)3
Publix   
PetSmart 2.8% BB+/NR
Bed, Bath & Beyond 2.4% BBB+/NR
Lowe's 2.4% A-/A3
Ross Stores 2.3%   
State of Indiana   
Marsh Supermarkets 2.2%
Dick's Sporting Goods 1.9%
Indiana Supreme Court
Staples 1.7% BBB/Baa2
Macerich Company (MAC)4
The Gap 2.6% BB+/NR
Limited Brands 2.4% BB+/Ba1
Forever 21   
Foot Locker 1.6% BB/Ba3
Abercrombie & Fitch 1.5%   
AT&T Mobility LLC 1.4% A-/A2
Golden Gate Capital (Eddie Bauer, Express, J. Jill) 1.3%   
Luxottica Group, S.P.A. 1.3% BBB+/NR
American Eagle Outfitters 1.1%   
Macy’s 1.0% BBB/Baa3
National Retail Properties, Inc. (NNN)6
The Pantry, Inc 6.6% B+/B2
Susser Holdings 6.4%   
Speedy Stop Food Stores, LLC 5.4%   
AMC 4.3% B/NR
BJ’s Wholesale Club 4.0% B+/B1
Best Buy 3.4% BBB-   /Baa2
Mister Car Wash   
Road Ranger, LLC   
Gander Mountain Company   
Pull-A-Part   
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
One Liberty Properties (OLP)9
Haverty 11.6%   
Office Depot 10.6% B-/B2
Ferguson Enterprises   
DSM Nutritional 5.8% A/A3
L-3 4.2% BBB-/BBB-
Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust (PEI)3
The Gap 3.7% BB+/NR
Foot Locker 2.4% BB/Ba3
JCPenney 2.4% BB/NR
Limited Brands 2.1% BB+/Ba1
American Eagle Outfitters 1.8%   
Sears Holding Corporation 1.7% CCC+/B3
Zale Corporation 1.4%  
Signet Jewelers 1.2%  
Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. 1.3%  
Bain Capital (Burlington Coat Factory, Gymboree)(3) 1.3%   
Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust (RPT)4
TJX Companies 4.4% A/A3
The Home Depot 2.0% A-/A3
Dollar Tree 1.9%   
Publix   
OfficeMax 1.7% B-/B1
Jo-Ann 1.6% B/B2
Burlington Coat Factory 1.5% B-/B3
PetSmart 1.5% BB+/NR
Bed, Bath & Beyond 1.4% BBB+/NR
Best Buy 1.4% BBB-  /Baa2
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Realty Income (O)7
AMC 5.3% B/NR
Diageo 5.0% A-/NR
LA Fitness 4.6%   
Northern Tier Energy/Super America 4.4%   
Hometown Buffet1   
Regal Cinemas 3.4% B+/B3
Friendly’s Ice Cream (Sun Capital Partners) 3.2%   
The Pantry 3.1% B+/B2
NPC International/Pizza Hut 2.7%   
BJ’s Wholesale Club 2.6% B+/B1
Regency Centers (REG)3
Kroger 4.4% 7.3% BBB/Baa2
Publix   
Safeway 3.8% 5.9% BBB/Baa3
Supervalu 2.4% 3.2% B+/B1
CVS 1.7% 1.8% BBB+/Baa2
Whole Foods 1.4% 0.8% BB+/NR
TJX Companies 1.3% 1.7% A/A3
Ahold 1.0% 1.2% BBB/Baa3
Blockbuster Video 1.0% 0.7%
Ross Stores 0.9% 1.0%   
Retail Opportunity Investments Corporation (ROIC)3
Safeway 10.4% BBB/Baa3
Haggen (Comvest has majority stake) 3.8%   
Rite Aid 3.8% B-/Caa2
New Seasons Market 0.0%   
Henry's Market Place (Apollo Global Management) 2.3% B+/NR
Office Depot 2.2% B-/B2
Kroger 2.0% BBB/Baa2
Fresh & Easy 2.0%   
Buy Buy Baby (Bed, Bath & Beyond) 1.9% BBB+/NR
Viva Market 0.0%   
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Roberts Realty Investors, Inc. (RPI)5
Bassett Furniture 25.3%   
Saul Centers, Inc. (BFS)3
Lowe’s 2.8% A-/A3
The Home Depot 2.8% A-/A3
Giant Food 2.6% BBB/Baa3
Safeway 2.2% BBB/Baa3
Publix   
Harris Teeter 1.1%   
Big Lots 0.9% BBB/NR
Trader Joe’s   
Marshalls 0.7% A/A3
Ross Stores 0.7%   
Simon Property Group, Inc. (SPG)4
The Gap 2.9% BB+/NR
Limited Brands 2.0% BB+/Ba1
Abercrombie & Fitch Co 1.6%   
Foot Locker 1.3% BB/Ba3
Luxottica Group, S.P.A. 1.1% BBB+/NR
Phillip-Van Heusen Corporation 1.0% BB+/Ba2
Zale Corporation 1.0%
American Eagle Outfitters 1.0%   
Genesco, Inc. 0.9% BB-/NR
Express 0.9% BB/NR
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. (SKT)8
The Gap 8.0% BB+/NR
Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation 6.2% BB+/Ba2
Dress Barn, Inc. 3.5%   
Nike 3.4% A+/A1
VF Outlet Inc. 3.1% A-/A3
Adidas 3.0%   
Carter's 2.6% BB+/NR
Liz Claiborne 2.4% B/B2
Polo Ralph Lauren 2.3% A-/A3
Hanesbrands Direct, LLC 2.2% BB-/Ba3
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Taubman Centers, Inc. (TCO)3
Forever 21 5.2%   
The Gap 4.8% BB+/NR
Limited Brands 3.4% BB+/Ba1
Abercrombie & Fitch 3.0%   
Williams-Sonoma 2.3%   
Hennes & Mauritz 2.2%   
Ann Taylor 2.1%   
Foot Locker 2.1% BB/Ba3
Express 2.0% BB/NR
American Eagle Outfitters 1.6%   
Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc. (UBA)3
Stop & Shop Supermarket 8.7% BBB/Baa3
Bed, Bath & Beyond 4.1% BBB+/NR
TJX Companies 2.9% A/A3
A&P1 B-/B3
ShopRite   
Staples 2.4% BBB/Baa2
Big Y   
Toys R Us 2.1% B/B1
BJ’s Wholesale Club 2.0% B+/B1
Sports Authority 1.4% B-/NR
Weingarten Realty Investors (WRI)4
Kroger 2.3% BBB/Baa2
TJX Companies 1.9% A/A3
Ross Stores 1.8%   
Safeway 1.2% BBB/Baa3
PetSmart 1.1% BB+/NR
The Home Depot 1.1% A-/A3
Office Depot 1.0% B-/B2
H E Butt Grocery   
Barnes & Noble 0.9%  
The Gap 0.9% BB+/NR
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Table 4 Cont. 
 
1. Company was delisted or filed for Chapter 11. 
2. Source: 10-K. ALX is managed by Vornado Realty Trust. ALX gave property tenants with square footage 
occupied and average property base rents. Used these rents and total rental revenue of $166,403,000 
(Bloomberg) to calculate an average PSF base rent of $17.02 to calculate percent of ABR. 
3. Source 10-K 
4. Source Q42010 Financial Supplement 
5. Source: 10-K. To estimate Bassett, used the ABR per square foot (PSF) times the occupied GLA divided by 
the total rental revenue, $1,545,000 (Bloomberg). 
6. Data came from Chris Barry in Investor Relations at NNN. 
7. Only the 2011 data was available on the company website. 
8. Q42010 Financial Supplement indicated top tenants as percentage of GLA. Used the average PSF rent of 
$19.45 to estimate ABR as a % of rental revenue of $186,890,000 (Bloomberg). 
9. Source: 10-K. Only indicated top 5 largest tenants suggesting that remaining tenants represent a very small 
percentage of ABR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
%  ABR
Private Equity  
%  ABR
Credit Rating 
(S&P/Moody's)
Whitestone REIT (WSR)3
Sports Authority 1.9% B-/NR
Compass Insurance
Brockett Davis Drake Inc.
Air Liquide America, L.P.
Kroger 1.0% BBB/Baa2
X-Ray X-Press Corporation
PetSmart 1.0% BB+/NR
Marshalls 0.9% A/A3
Rock Solid Images 0.9%   
Merrill Corporation
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Table 5—Regression Results Using Volatility as Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
TOP10_PUBLIC 0.04 0.49* 0.48** 0.46** 0.46** 0.48** 0.29* 0.37* -0.08
(0.204) (0.274) (0.218) (0.219) (0.216) (0.208) (0.164) (0.182) (0.303)
TOP10_PE -1.31*** -1.43*** -0.87** -1.03** -1.05** -1.04** -1.03** -0.76** -2.17***
(0.454) (0.416) (0.342) (0.402) (0.429) (0.435) (0.457) (0.347) (0.706)
INVESTMENT_GRADE -0.63*** -0.43** -0.42** -0.42** -0.42** -0.38** -0.34*** -0.30
(0.208) (0.163) (0.151) (0.159) (0.164) (0.142) (0.104) (0.390)
LEVERAGE 0.11*** 0.08** 0.07** 0.08** 0.06* 0.11*** 0.08**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.031)
ROE -0.37* -0.35 -0.33 -0.41* -0.26 -0.50**
(0.181) (0.229) (0.229) (0.217) (0.185) (0.186)
BOOKTOMKT 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.048) (0.068) (0.065) (0.064)
SIZE 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
AGE 0.05** 0.07*** 0.03**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
NORTHEAST -0.19**
(0.087)
MIDWEST -0.10
(0.077)
SOUTH -0.04
(0.055)
SHOPPING_CENTER -0.09
(0.172)
SINGLE_TENANT 0.13
(0.222)
REGIONAL_MALL -0.09
(0.213)
Constant 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.29
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.188) (0.174) (0.156) (0.186)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.10 0.31 0.52 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.68 0.79 0.78
Adj. R-Squared 0.03 0.24 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.56 0.67 0.68
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6—Regression Results Using ROE, ROA, and Occupancy as Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES ROE ROA OCCUPANCY
TOP10_PUBLIC -0.12 0.01 0.14
(0.204) (0.054) (0.132)
TOP10_PE -0.20 0.12* 0.81*
(0.431) (0.068) (0.464)
INVESTMENT_GRADE 0.06 0.01 0.18
(0.163) (0.039) (0.173)
LEVERAGE -0.05** -0.02** 0.05*
(0.024) (0.007) (0.027)
ROE 0.18
(0.150)
BOOKTOMKT -0.20** -0.05*** -0.07
(0.077) (0.014) (0.056)
SIZE -0.04 -0.00 0.02*
(0.023) (0.005) (0.011)
AGE 0.00
(0.005)
NORTHEAST 0.03*
(0.017)
MIDWEST 0.02
(0.018)
SOUTH 0.01
(0.011)
Constant 0.49* 0.06* 0.69***
(0.249) (0.03) (0.113)
Observations 30 30 30
R-squared 0.52 0.76 0.60
Adj. R-Squared 0.40 0.63 0.47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 7—International Council of Shopping Centers Retail Specifications 
 
 TYPE   CONCEPT   SQ. FT. (Inc. Anchors)   ACREAGE  
 TYPICAL  NUMBER OF 
ANCHOR(S)   TYPE  %  GLA ANCHOR 
 NEIGHBORHOOD CENTER  Convenience   30,000 - 150,000   3 - 15   1 or more  Supermarket   30 - 50%  
 COMMUNITY CENTER  General Merchandise; Convenience   100,000 - 350,000   10 - 40   2 or more  Discount dept. store; super-market; 
drug; home improvement; large 
specialty/discount apparel  
 40 - 60%  
 REGIONAL CENTER  General Merchandise; Fashion 
(Mall, typically enclosed)  
 400,000 - 800,000   40 - 100   2 or more  Full-line dept. store; jr. dept. store; 
mass merchant; disc. dept. store; 
fashion apparel  
 50 - 70%  
 SUPERREGIONAL CENTER  Similar to Regional Center but has 
more variety and assortment  
 800,000+   60 - 120   3 or more  Full-line dept. store; jr. dept. store; 
mass merchant; fashion apparel  
 50 - 70%  
 FASHION/SPECIALTY CENTER  Higher end, fashion oriented   80,000 - 250,000   5 - 25   N/A  Fashion   N/A  
 POWER CENTER  Category-dominant anchors; few 
small tenants  
 250,000 - 600,000   25 - 80   3 or more  Category killer; home im-provement; 
disc. dept. store; warehouse club; 
off-price  
 75 - 90%  
 THEME/FESTIVAL CENTER  Leisure; tourist-oriented; retail and 
service  
 80,000 - 250,000   5 - 20   N/A  Restaurants; entertainment   N/A  
 OUTLET CENTER  Manufacturers' outlet stores   50,000 - 400,000   10 - 50   N/A  Manufacturers' outlet stores   N/A  
1. Source: International Council of Shopping Centers
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Table 8—Top 100 Retail Companies by Sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Private Equity Private Government
Ownership 
Details
Wal-Mart X
Kroger X
Target X
Walgreens X
The Home Depot X
Costco X
CVS X
Lowe's X
Best Buy X
Sears Holdings X
Safeway X
Supervalu X
Rite Aid X
Publix
Macy's X
Ahold USA/Royal Ahold X
McDonald's X
Delhaize America X
Amazon.com X
Kohl's X
Apple Stores X
JC Penney X
Yum! X
TJX X
True Value X
Meijer X
HEB X
Dollar General X
ShopRite X
Gap X
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Table 8 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Private Equity Private Government
Ownership 
Details
BJ's X Leonard Green 
& Partners and 
CVC Capital 
Partners
Subway X
Wendy's/Arby's X
Nordstrom X
Staples X
Ace Hardware X
Toys R Us X Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts, 
Bain Capital 
Partners LLC, 
Vornado Realty 
Trust
Whole Foods X
Bed Bath & Beyond X
7-Eleven X
Burger King Holdings X 3G Capital
Aldi X
Army Air Force Exchange X
Limited Brands X
A&P X
Menard X
Verizon Wireless X
Family Dollar X
Ross Stores X
Darden Restaurants X
Starbucks X
Office Depot X
Winn-Dixie Stores X
Hy-Vee X
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Table 8 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Private Equity Private Government
Ownership 
Details
Trader Joe's X
GameStop X
Giant Eagle X
AutoZone X
Dillard's X
DineEquity X
Advance AutoParts X
DollarTree X
Barnes & Noble X
Office Max X
Wegmans Food Markets X
O'Reilly Automotive X
QVC X
Defense Commisary Agency X
AT&T Wireless X
Save Mart X
Dell X
Big Lots X
PetSmart X
RadioShack X
Alimentation Couche-Tard X
Dick's Sporting Goods X
Albertsons X
WinCo Foods X
Sherwin-Williams X
Ruddick Corp. (Harris Teeter) X
Neiman Marcus X TPG Capital, 
Warburg 
Pincus
Michaels Stores X Bain Capital, 
Blackstone 
Group, 
Highfields 
Capital 
Management
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Table 8 Cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Private Equity Private Government
Ownership 
Details
Burlington Coat Factory X Bain Capital
Tractor Supply Co. X
Stater Bros Holdings X
Foot Locker X
Belk X
Price Chopper Supermarkets X
IKEA North America X
Williams-Sonoma X
Sports Authority X Leonard Green 
& Partners
SonyStyle X
Raley's X
OSI Restaurant Partners X Kangaroo 
Holdings, Bain 
Capital
Ingles Markets X
Brinker International X
HSN X
Bon-Ton Stores X
Abercrombie & Fitch X
ShopKo Stores X Sun Capital 
Partners
Total 67 11 19 2
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